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In this article, the author tackles two different legal aspects of the developing area of 
Global Constitutional law. The first essay draws a comparison between the varying 
theories and opinions of two authors in the field; Dieter Grimm and Mattias Kumm. 
The work of these two authors is outlined and compared. The second essay deals with 
the way in which a US Supreme Court judgment (Roper vs. Simmons) addresses a 
problematic facet of Global Constitutional Law. The case itself is outlined, along with 
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In this part, the author draws a comparison between the varying theories and opinions 
of two authors in the field of global constitutional law; Dieter Grimm and Mattias 
Kumm. The work of these two authors is outlined and compared, resulting in a 
determination of which position is the most persuasive in the author’s view. 
 
1. ‘Grimm on the Issue of the ‘Global Constitutional Law’  
 
‘After 225 years, constitutionalism seems now to have reached the peak of its 
development.’ - Grimm 
 
1.1. External Culmination vs. Internal Erosion  
 
Dieter Grimm, a professor at Humboldt and Yale universities and former member of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, holds a traditional position on the issue of 
the ‘Global Constitutional Law’ (GCL), saying that the ‘external success’ of 
constitutionalism, through the development of international law and actors, has brought 
along with it an ‘internal erosion’ of national constitutional law. States have lost the 
monopoly of public power over their territory, hindering the achievement of 
constitutionalism altogether.370 Internal erosion arises due to the fact that the 
Constitution and the State Powers are no longer the only powers on the scene, but other 
actors begin to feature, such as the European Union (EU), which interfere with the 
serenity of Member States (MS). 
 
Developments at international level do not concern a constitution with legal force, but 
acts which eventually end up in the constitutions of MS. In Europe, for example, the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and EU primary law are analysed in 
terms of constitutional law. Authors also view public international law (such as the 
United Nations (UN) Charter and texts of other international organisations such as the 
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World Trade Organisation (WTO)) as acquiring constitutional status and are being 
interpreted as constitutions. Even global public policy networks and self-organisation 
processes of private global actors are discussed in terms of constitutionalism. All of 
these were previously not regarded as constitutions.  
 
1.2. Definition of Constitutionalism  
 
To appreciate the effect of this development on national constitutions371, a clear 
definition is necessary. Grimm defines ‘constitutionalism’ by reference to history, 
starting from before the two revolutions against Britain and France, through the 
Reformation and French Revolution and into the modern day. He outlines 5 
characteristics of constitutionalism: (a) the modern constitution is a set of legal norms 
emanating from a political decision; (b) the purpose is to regulate the establishment 
and exercise of public power; (c) the regulation is comprehensive as there are no extra-
constitutional means of exercising public power; (d) constitutional law finds its origin 
with the people as the only legitimate source of power; and (e) constitutional law is a 
higher law, enjoying primacy over all other laws and legal acts.  
 
This gives a different definition of a constitution to that which we are accustomed to 
(democracy, rule of law, separation of powers and fundamental rights). Yet, Grimm 
mentions two elements of constitutionalism: the democratic element and the rule of law 
element. He adds that the constitution could only emerge through two preconditions. 
Firstly, there must be an object (a state) capable of being regulated. Secondly, the 
state’s public power is without an external competitor within the territory. 
Consequently, the state’s legal force ends at the border of the territory, and no foreign 
power can bind the domestic sphere. This highlights the importance of the boundary 
between the internal and external. Nevertheless, he adds that ‘above the state was no 
lawless zone’, and rules of public international law apply, limited to external relations 
of states and cannot interfere with internal affairs. Thus, constitutional law (internal 
law) and international law (external law) could exist independently of each other. 
 
1.3. The Present and Future: The Blurring of Two Boundaries 
 
Grimm maintains that we live in a period of erosion of statehood, with the blurring of 
two traditional boundaries. The boundary between public and private has become 
porous due to expansion of State tasks which require the State to seek help from private 
 
371 Grimm defines a ‘constitution’ as a coherent and comprehensive regulation of the 
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actors and rely on negotiations with them rather than legal orders addressed to them. 
Thus, agreements replace laws. Private actors have a share in public power without the 
requirements of legitimation and accountability that the constitution establishes for 
public actors.  
 
The boundary between inside and outside became permeable when States began to 
establish and transfer sovereignty to international organisations to enhance their 
problem-solving capacity. A classic example of this would be the UN and international 
courts. As a result, states did not remain as sovereign as they had previously been. 
 
The shift is particularly clear on a European level, where one finds the Council of 
Europe and its judicial acts through the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
binding all 46 MS. Above all, the power of the EU has a bigger effect on MS 
sovereignty as it encompasses legislative, administrative and judicial acts. Regardless, 
MS retain the power of self-determination. However, EU law claims primacy over 
domestic law, and hence the state is no longer the exclusive source of law within the 
territory. On this note, reference can be made to the recent Swiss Referendum. The 
primacy of constitutional law is no longer exclusive, and although it prevails over 
ordinary domestic law, it does not prevail in general. Furthermore, although the 
constitution still emanates from the people, not all public power taking effect within 
the state finds its source within the democratic legitimation of the people any longer. 
For this reason, Grimm maintains that statehood is eroding, that the constitution has 
shrunk in importance, and that only when national constitutional law and international 
law are seen together is one able to obtain a complete picture of the legal conditions 
for political rule in a country.  
 
The question which arises is whether the loss of importance which the constitution 
suffers at national level can be compensated for at international level. Grimm brings 
up ‘constitutionalisation’ as a constitution-building process beyond the state which 
applies to international political entities and international legal documents and is even 
extended to rule making of public-private partnerships on the international level and of 
globally active private actors. Grimm also wonders whether there exists an object 
capable of being constitutionalised at international level. Although certain entities, 
such as the EU, may come close, certain elements still lack, such as, inter alia, how the 
Treaties are not an expression of self-determination of a people or society, and how the 
Treaties lack democratic origin. Grimm further states that a constitution could possibly 
originate from a treaty should the test of provision for amendments be satisfied, since 
if amendment power rests not in the hands of the MS but in the hands of the newly 
created state which has gained power of self-determination, then the legal foundation 
would have turned into a constitution. However, this of course is not the case. 
  




At a global level, Grimm also refers to institutions such as the WTO, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) which although 
are of great importance, are limited in competencies and have a non-democratic 
structure, all of which keeps them from being called ‘constitutions. 
  




2. Kumm on the Issue of the ‘Global Constitutional Law’ 
 
‘The language of constitutionalism has become widespread among international 
lawyers.’ - Kumm 
 
Mattias Kumm, a professor of Law at New York University, holds an opposite position 
to Grimm and could be identified as one of the strongest supporters of GCL. He speaks 
about the cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism. 
 
2.1. ‘Constitutionalism’ vs. ‘constitutionalism’ 
 
Kumm differentiates between constitutionalism with a ‘big C’ and ‘small c’. The 
former depicts traditional domestic constitutionalism, linked to a written Constitution’s 
ultimate legal authority in the service of the democratic people governing themselves 
(‘We the People’), as embodied in Grimm’s position. The latter describes 
constitutionalism in respect of international law, a coherent legal system with some 
structural features of domestic constitutional law, but not connected to establishment 
of an ultimate authority, coercive powers of state institutions or self-governing 
practices of a people. Regardless of this clear distinction, when constitutional 
vocabulary is used beyond the state, the aura of legitimacy and authority associated 
with ‘big C’ Constitutionalism is often conferred on intentional practices, creating an 
illusion upon a deeply fragmented global arena. This, says Kumm, is ‘the core of the 
skeptic’s challenge’.372 
 
2.2. Statist Paradigm vs. Cosmopolitan Paradigm 
 
‘Cosmopolitan constitutionalism establishes an integrative basic conceptual 
framework for a general theory of public law that integrates national and 
international law.’ - Kumm 
 
The statist, traditional paradigm seeks to ensure that international law remains firmly 
grounded in state consent. Thus, international law matters only if and to the extent that 
the national Constitution so determines, without acknowledging constitutionalism 
beyond the State. This reflects Grimm’s traditional idea. 
 
372 M. Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between 
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Contrarily, Kumm advocates for the cosmopolitan paradigm, encouraging the 
progressive development of international legal authority, in which arrangements are 
assessed in terms of public reason (where legal authority rests on formal, jurisdictional, 
procedural, and substantive principles) rather than the people’s democracy. It is worth 
noting that Kumm does not claim that international law is inherently legitimate, nor 
does the cosmopolitan paradigm embrace a simple international legalism that suggests 
that everyone has an innate disposition to follow international law. The cosmopolitan 
paradigm uses a holistic cognitive frame to establish and identify an internal connection 
and common basic structural features between national and international law, which 
connection extends to the development of legal authority, procedural legitimacy, and 
the practice of human and constitutional rights.  
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism views national constitutional practice as an integral 
part of a global practice of law and conceives public international law in light of basic 
constitutional principles. Ultimate authority is thus, vested in the principles of 
constitutionalism that inform legal and political practice nationally and internationally.  
 
2.3. Constitutional Pluralism 
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism creates a third position to describe the relationship 
between national and international law, that of Constitutional Pluralism, which goes 
beyond the traditional monism and dualism. Kumm feels that it is a mistake to imagine 
the world of law as a hierarchically integrated whole, as monism does, and that it is 
also a mistake to imagine national and international law as strictly separate legal 
systems, as dualism does. Rather, common principles underlying both national and 
international law provide a coherent framework for addressing conflicting claims of 
authority in specific contexts. These principles may favour the application of 
international rules over national rules, or vice versa. This is a very different approach 
to that of Grimm, who would not accept international rules taking primacy over 
national rules, and possibly even over the national Constitution.  
 
Nevertheless, although Kumm maintains that international legal sources can prevail 
over national ones; this is limited by the guarantee to protect countervailing 










3. Brief Overview of Other Perspectives 
3.1. Anne Peters: Compensatory Constitutionalism 
 
Anne Peters is a constitutional and international lawyer whose ideologies oppose 
Grimm’s, yet have some common features, showing that there are objective elements 
in GCL. She discusses de-constitutionalisation on the domestic level, an idea similar 
to Grimm’s erosion of sovereignty. 
 
State Constitutions can no longer regulate the totality of governance in a 
comprehensive way and are thus, no longer self-sufficient ‘total Constitutions’. For this 
reason, Peters asks for compensatory constitutionalism, since only the various levels 
of governance, taken together, can provide full constitutional protection. For a 
traditional constitutional lawyer like Grimm, it is difficult to agree that international 
rules and principles deserve the label of ‘constitution’, and thus, this is where Peters 
differs from Grimm. A traditional constitutional lawyer is unable to agree with the 
continuing process of the emergence, creation and identification of constitution-like 
elements in the international legal order as he would have to admit that there is a legal 
order above the Constitution. 
 
Peters also shows how international actors can effect constitutional national sources 
for the best, using the example of the South African apartheid system. International law 
can help legal orders which diverge from basic fundamental principles of human rights, 
democracy and rule of law to readdress them. Thus, the international and national can 
no longer be neatly separated and the relationship between them cannot be described 
as a clear hierarchy, but rather as a network. 
 
Peters identifies three democratic deficiencies within nation States: (1) due to global 
interdependence, State activities became far reaching and extraterritorial, political 
decisions on environmental and nuclear subjects affect people in other states which 
have not elected the decision-makers making these decisions. This leads to an indirect 
decline of democracy; (2) mobility and the transnational character of issues diminish 
the nation state’s power to solve problems by itself; (3) lack of democratic mandate for 
or control of non-state international actors. In order to regain control, States have to 
cooperate with international organisations, through bilateral and multilateral treaties. 
In conclusion, if we want to preserve a minimum level of democratic governance, we 




must move ‘beyond the State’ and establish compensatory, transnational democratic 
structures.373 
3.2. Teubner: Societal Constitutionalism  
 
Teubner highlights that constitutional theory’s challenge today is both privatisation and 
globalisation. Constitutionalism must move ‘beyond the nation state’ in a double sense: 
into the transnational sphere and into the private sector. He brings in sociological 
aspects: sectors of world society begin to develop step by step their own constitutional 
norms. Pressing social problems that accrue within autonomous world systems produce 
social conflicts resulting in legal norms of a constitutional quality, these norms then 
become aggregated, over time, into sectoral constitutions of world society. His analysis 
is based on empirical observations. 
3.3. Maduro: Global Governance 
 
Maduro argues that constitutionalism is applicable to global governance, which is the 
ensemble of the public, private, formal, informal, regulatory bodies to which the 
national states devolve part of their power for regulatory norms. He draws a line 
between constitutionalism and national constitutions, saying that constitutions are 
sources of law and that constitutionalism is both a philosophical and normative theory. 
Traditionally, constitution and power coincided in the same locus: the state. 
Contemporary constitutionalism advances a shift of power from inside national borders 
to outside. To move constitutionalism to the arena of global governance is to move it 
beyond a normative theory of social decision making. Having constitutionalism 
without a constitution. Even if such a move is necessary and possible it does not mean 
that such a form of constitutionalism can and should overcome constitutionalism linked 
to national political communities.  
 
4. The Most Persuasive Position: a Personal Opinion 
 
Following an objective overview of various positions, I will now seek to determine 
which position persuades me the most. Grimm is strongly hesitant about the 
construction of a constitution at a global level. In fact, in his opinion, the EU Treaties, 
the WTO, etc., cannot be considered constitutions. He maintains that strengthening the 
International level could only happen if the international order could develop into an 
object capable of being constitutionalised and which has a democratic governance on 
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the global level, which he sees as highly unlikely. Thus, Grimm finds it preferable to 
drop the notions of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation altogether, since they 
are misleading in that the loss national constitutions suffer from internationalisation 
and globalisation could not be compensated for on the supranational level. International 
actors are not a solution for this erosion. He refers to this as an illusion. 
 
Kumm outlines three main negative elements of the statist paradigm: (a) it exaggerates 
ideals of coherence and legitimacy of domestic constitutional practices; (b) casts 
suspicion over legal practices ‘beyond the state’; (c) neglects the connection between 
domestic legitimacy and the global legal context in which these practices take place. 
Furthermore, the conceptual structure of the statist paradigm, with its sharp and basic 
distinction between State law and international law, distorts complex legal and political 
realities, making it no longer satisfactory.  
 
On the other hand, the cosmopolitan paradigm provides a unifying framework for the 
analysis of at least four phenomena: (a) the interface between national and international 
law; (b) expansion of governance structures within international law (such as global 
administrative law); (c) functional reconceptualisation of sovereignty; and (d) basic 
structural features of contemporary human rights practice.374 Cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism presents a legal argument and not just an ideal one. It deals with a 
basic conceptual framework to organise legal materials and structure legal debates. 
Although the cosmopolitan paradigm might not be morally attractive since people think 
of themselves primarily as national citizens, using an example of religion, Kumm 
maintains that just as religion can flourish in a country without an official religion, so 
national patriotism and democratic self-government can flourish within a national 
constitutional framework that is conceived within a cosmopolitan paradigm. Kumm 
also states that the idea of self-governing free and equals cannot be developed within 
absolute nationalism, as this goes against the horizon of a liberated humanity. 
 
A traditional position (depicted by Grimm) has a tendency to be more structured and 
possibly more convincing since it is based on established constitutional law practice. 
However, we must acknowledge that as the world evolves, legal elements must evolve 
too, and the world is evolving in a globalised way, meaning that our laws, values and 
norms will evolve similarly, requiring authors such as Kumm to begin to draw up 
theories to ground the developing global practices. For this reason, I believe that the 
traditional position deserves reconsideration in the light of globalisation. I thus,find 
Kumm’s theory more persuasive, albeit avant-garde. Lastly, I would like to add that 
the international and national already complement each other and should do so even 
more in the future. 
 
374 This latter point can be understood through Roper vs. Simmons. 







1. Roper vs. Simmons: Case Summary 
 
In this article, the author explores the way in which a US Supreme Court judgment 
(Roper vs. Simmons) addresses a problematic facet of Global Constitutional Law by 
outlining the case itself, along with its dissenting opinions. 
1.1. Facts of the case 
 
Simmons, the defendant, planned, detailed and committed the robbery and murder of 
Shirley Crook at age 17. On turning 18, he was sentenced to death. The case revolved 
around the death penalty for minors. 
 
The Court at first sentenced him to death; however he filed numerous petitions arguing 
for his minor status. Although rejected at first, soon enough, the Court in Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002) held that the Eighth Amendment375, applicable through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits the execution of a mentally retarded person. Simmons then 
argued that, with the same reasoning, the Constitution also prohibits the execution of a 
juvenile who was under 18 when committing murder, putting mentally retarded people 
in a comparable position to the immature development of a minor. 
 
1.2. The Verdict 
 
The case was decided in 2005 by the US Supreme Court. The Court agreed with 
Simmons’ arguments, sentencing him to life imprisonment without eligibility for 
release, although Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) rejected the idea that the Constitution 
bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders under 18.  
 
The US Supreme Court referred to positions of other States to extract that a national 
consensus has developed against the execution of minor offenders, where it saw the 
rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States, the infrequency of its 
 
375 The Eighth Amendment of the United States (US) Constitution prohibits the federal 
government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments. It is 
worth noting the contradiction between the Eighth Amendment and allowing for the death 
penalty.  




use even where it remains on the books, and the consistency in the trend toward 
abolition of the practice, concluding that today’s society views juveniles as, in the 
words of the Atkins case describing the mentally retarded, ‘categorically less culpable 
than the average criminal.’ 
 
The Court also concluded that according to the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, 
and keeping in mind the instability and emotional imbalance of young people, 
sentencing a minor to death is cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
The US Supreme Court confirmed this verdict by reference to foreign precedents and 
sources of law which do not apply the death penalty against juvenile offenders. The 
judgement highlights the importance and supremacy of the American Constitution then 
goes on to say that ‘It does not lessen our fidelity to the constitution or our pride in its 
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by 
other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within 
our own heritage of freedom.’376 
 
Previous cases, such as the Atkins case and Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), also make 
reference to foreign laws. The Court in Roper v. Simmons mentions Article 37 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every country in the world has 
ratified save for the US and Somalia. It contains an express prohibition on capital 
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18. The Court states that the US 
stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty. 
Reference is made to United Kingdom (UK) legislation, due to historic ties and origins 
of the Eighth Amendment. The Court explicitly says that ‘[t]he opinion of the world 
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions.’ 
 
2. Dissenting Opinions 
2.1. Justice O’Connor 
 
Justice O’Connor is not convinced of a national consensus being reached about 
abolishing capital punishment for under-18 offenders, let alone an international 
consensus, and thus, feels that ‘the Eighth Amendment does not, at this time, forbid 
capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in all cases.’377 
 
 
376 Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
377 ibid. 




Yet she disagrees with Justice Scalia’s opinion that foreign and international law have 
no place in American Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. She admits that the Court 
consistently refers to relevant foreign and international law when assessing evolving 
standards of decency. She feels that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning directly 
from the maturing values of civilised society, which are neither wholly isolated from, 
nor inherently at odds with, values of other countries. Therefore, although she sees 
congruence between American and international values, in her opinion, the case at hand 
presents no domestic consensus and the recent emergence of otherwise global 
consensus cannot change that.  
2.2. Justice Scalia 
 
‘To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, 
is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry.’ - Justice Scalia 
 
Justice Scalia starts off his dissenting opinion by reference to Alexander Hamilton. He 
outlines the mockery which the opinion in this judgement makes of Hamilton’s 
expectation as he points out how the Court concluded that the meaning of the American 
Constitution has changed over the previous 15 years since the Stanford v. Kentucky 
judgement, and not that the Court’s decision had been wrong.  
 
He justifies his dissent in this case by saying that the Court, as the sole arbiter of 
America’s moral standards, discharges such immense responsibility by taking guidance 
from the views of foreign courts and legislatures, and he does not believe that the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment and any other provisions of the American 
Constitution, should be determined by such views. He further comments that the views 
of American citizens themselves and of national legislatures are irrelevant or frivolous 
to the current Court verdict, while the views of other countries and of the international 
community ‘take centre stage’.378 
 
Scalia mentions the Court’s reference to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which the Senate ratified subject to a reservation regarding capital 
punishment. He sarcastically comments that, ‘[u]nless the court has added to its arsenal 
the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf of the United States,’ this evidence does 
not favour, but rather refutes, the position taken in this judgement. It goes to show that 
the US has either not reached a national consensus on the question, or has reached a 
consensus contrary to what the Court announces. Scalia further notes the inconsistency 
in the Court’s reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as it also 
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prohibits punishing under-18 offenders with life imprisonment without the possibility 
of release, and therefore the Court is still not in line with the international community. 
 
Scalia maintains that foreign law should also not be considered because foreign 
authorities do not speak about issues typical to the US, such as how the sentencing 
authority can withhold the death penalty from an under-18 offender and mitigate the 
punishment. 
 
More fundamentally, Scalia believes that the Court’s basic argument, that American 
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world, ought to be outright rejected, 
as in many imperative respects such laws differ from American national law. Scalia 
goes on to give examples of important differing laws, such as abortion, where he further 
says that ‘although the Government … urged the Court to follow the international 
community’s lead, these arguments fell on deaf ears.’ 
 
Scalia expresses how the Court’s special reliance on UK laws is probably the most 
indefensible, as although it is true that the US shares a common history with the UK, 
and that English sources are often consulted in regard to the meaning of a 18th century 
constitutional text, the Court has long rejected a purely originalist approach to the 
Eighth Amendment. Rather, the Court seeks to determine current standards of decency 
within the nation. In Scalia’s opinion, this gives all the more reason not look to a 
country (UK) that has developed in tandem with European continental influences and 
whose positions have changed over the years, such as allowing all but the most serious 
offenders to be tried by magistrates without a jury, which, if taken into consideration, 
would curtail the American right to jury trial in criminal cases. 
 
Lastly, Scalia comments on the Court’s attempt to praise the Constitution and assure 
that reference to foreign law underscores the centrality of the same issues within the 
American heritage of freedom. The strong-minded judge believes that the foreign 
sources were cited to set aside centuries-old American practice, a practice which a large 
number of States still adhere to, and that the foreign sources, rather, only affirm the 
Justices’ own opinion as to how the world, America and this case ought to be.  
 
3. Problematic Facet of ‘Global Constitutional Law’: Use of Foreign Law 
 
It becomes evident that the problematic facet of ‘Global Constitutional Law’ is the use 
of foreign law in the above judgement. The statements outlined by Justice Scalia 
contrast greatly with the decision of the Court, and serve as effective food for thought. 
Although the above dissenting opinions perfectly outline the issue at hand, I would like 
to discuss this facet further.  
 
 





3.1. Transnational Judicial Dialogue 
 
The US Supreme Court did not only rely on its interpretation of the American 
Constitution, but also on foreign sources of law in its constitutional analysis. The 
transnational dialogue which constitutional courts of the world engage in is legal, but 
a large role is also played by the culture and attitude of the constitutional judges. In 
fact, this case engaged in a deep world-wide discussion, allowing for a transnational 
dialogue. For this reason, global constitutionalism can be created through formal 
channels but also through cultural channels. Constitutional courts all around the world 
are increasingly citing and referring to foreign legal precedents in a wide range of legal 
issues, mainly constitutional and fundamental rights issues. These interactions among 
world courts have thus developed a transnational judicial dialogue where courts use 
comparative public legal analyses to foster cross-fertilisation of ideas and practices. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter describes this as a ‘process of collective judicial deliberation on 
a set of common problems.379 This statement is bold and revolutionary as she speaks 
of something outside the traditional national judicial deliberation, which a scholar such 
as Grimm (see discussion in Part I above) would be accustomed to, as judicial 
deliberation in a national constitutional order takes place among nationally elected 
judges. A collective global judicial deliberation fosters the idea of a world-wide 
deliberation among judges appointed in different countries, an idea which seems 
peculiar at first glance and which has created a lot of discussion and contradicting 
opinions. 
 
The increasing reference to foreign sources of law on the part of several constitutional 
court judges indicates a desire to participate in this transnational judicial dialogue. This 
phenomenon attracted many American scholars but there is great division on this topic 
among US constitutional court justices. This is clearly seen in the Roper vs. Simmons 
case as although the majority opinion refers to foreign law, Justice Scalia, one of the 
greatest constitutional scholars with a traditional and conservative outlook, strongly 
dissents. Scalia, the father of originalism380, has stated that ‘I probably use more foreign 
legal materials than anyone else on the court… of course they are all fairly old foreign 
legal materials, and they are all English,’381 referring to the foundations of the US 
 
379 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology Of Transjudicial Communication (1994) 
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=1&article=2120&context=lawreview> accessed 3 December 2018. 
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Constitution. Scalia believes that foreign materials are irrelevant to an interpretation of 
the US Constitution. However, he has also said that the use of foreign legal materials 
is legitimate in certain cases, such as when federal courts interpret a treaty to which the 
US is a party.382 In his remarks at the American Society of International Law 
Conference in March 2004, Scalia concluded that ‘[c]omparative study is useful ... not 
as a convenient means of facilitating judicial updating of the U.S. Constitution, but as 
a source of example and experience that we may use, democratically, to change our 
laws - or even, if it is appropriate, democratically to change our Constitution.’383 The 
emphasis on ‘democratically’ here indicates that the legislator is better suited to change 
the interpretation of national legislation than the judge is, since the legislator is 
‘democratically’ elected. The use of the word ‘democratically’ can also show how 
constitutional judges of foreign countries cannot form a legitimate source of 
interpretation for other countries.  
 
3.2. Foreign Law Debate: Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat 
 
Moshe Cohen Eliya and Iddo Porat, professors at the University of Israel, speak of a 
culture of authority and a culture of justification.384 A difference between the two is 
represented by the role of text and its interpretation in constitutional law. In the case of 
the former, the court is an institution which must base its legitimacy on the authority 
of the constitutional text authorising the court to review governmental action. While in 
the latter culture, the judiciary’s role is to demand that the government justify its 
actions, downplaying the importance of the text.  
 
On this note, we can compare originalism to anti-textualism. Originalism is a very 
American concept where the judges recognise that they are not governing the state and 
that their only role is to interpret the constitution in the manner in which the founding 
fathers originally intended. Anti-textualism, on the other hand, does not pay very close 
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It is also worth mentioning the divide between conservatives and liberals. 
Conservatives believe that each country is unique with its own culture and 
characteristics and feel that interpreting a constitution by relying on foreign sources of 
law would lead to illegitimacy. Liberals, however, see themselves as citizens of the 
world, finding no reason why not to refer to experiences of other countries. 
 
The use of foreign law is not without its flaws. Many identify the concept of a ‘race to 
the top’ where judges refer to cases in which a bigger protection of human rights was 
adopted. Another is that of ‘cherry picking’, a practice of picking a reference which 
best suits the case at hand and best fulfils the result the judge wishes to achieve. 
 
Another useful point is Justice Breyer’s attempt to introduce proportionality into 
American constitutional law in the Heller Case, which may be problematic since it 
disregards the different cultural meanings that are associated with proportionality in 
Germany and balancing in the US. Justice Scalia in fact rejected Breyer’s suggestion, 
arguing that adopting the proportionality approach would water down the rights 
enumerated in the Constitution.385 In one of their writings, Cohen-Eliya and Porat 
concluded that ‘The use of the term proportionality may help to open the door for 
European influences on American constitutional law. Arguably, such a move should 
have been done more openly by making the reference to foreign law explicit rather than 
implicit.’386 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
By way of conclusion, although the majority of Justices in Roper vs. Simmons looked 
towards foreign sources of law to base their judgement, the use of foreign law remains 
hotly debated with many contrasting viewpoints. Nevertheless, when taking into 
consideration the current ongoing globalisation which the world is facing, reference to 
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